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Northeast Ohio’s Regional Economy: 
An Assessment of the Economic State of the Region and its Political Challenges 
 
The Cleveland-Akron metropolitan area in Northeast Ohio is of great interest to students 
of regional economic development for two reasons.  First, it is a well-integrated, multi-
nucleated, industrial economy that lacks a coordinating regional unit of government but 
still manages to make strategic investments through a dense network of private-public 
partnerships and the intervention of state government, along with the formal coordination 
of the regional highway system through the State’s Department of transportation.  While 
partnerships are common, local governments within this region are highly competitive for 
both middle and upper-income residents and business facilities.  The second reason for 
interest in the region is the profound economic restructuring that occurred in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  There is interest in the mechanisms that were developed to 
accommodate changes in the competitive reality that local businesses faced in the 
marketplace.  In this paper we first review this economic history and introduce the 
economic geography of the region.  These sections are then followed by a discussion of 
the size and structure of the regional economy, emphasizing the relationship between the 
region’s two major urban centers, Akron and Cleveland, not only to each other but also to 
newer “edge cities.”  We also spend time considering the meaning of “high technology” 
employment in the context of a highly industrialized regional economy.   The 
technological content of work deserves attention because it is often asserted that the slow 
rate of regional employment growth is attributable to weakness in the economy’s 
technological base.  We demonstrate that to the contrary, employment in this region is 
technologically sophisticated, especially in the area around Cleveland.  Regional efforts 
at economic coordination are discussed in the next to last section of the paper, which is 
followed by a set of concluding observations. 
At the end of the Second World War, Northeast Ohio consisted of a series of 
mostly self-contained factory cities buffered from each other by extensive farmland and 
connected by electric inter-urban railways (also known as trolley cars) and city streets.  
The system of limited access highways (popularly called interstate highways) that define 
the region today was not begun until the mid-1950s, and these separate economies were 
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connected to the rest of the United States through a dense web of rail lines.1  Northeast 
Ohio’s series of prototypical American industrial cities centered on Cleveland and its 
immediate suburbs (Map 1); Akron—America’s rubber and tire capital until the 1970s is 
67 kilometers to the south; 20 kilometers to the east is the city of Euclid—known for 
heavy industrial production; and about 50 kilometers to the west are the twin 
manufacturing cities of Lorain and Elyria.  These five cities did not constitute an 
integrated regional economy at the end of the war because each had its own labor, 
housing, and retail markets.  The connection between them was based on what they 
made—these were cities that produced both consumer durable goods and capital goods in 
unionized factories.  Wage levels between the cities were largely linked through union 
agreements, not by the ebb and flow of commuting workers. 
 
Map 1
 
                                                 
1 See “Highways” in the Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, http://ech.cwru.edu/scripts/article.asp?ID=H2 
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Since the late mid- to late-1960s, however, much has changed.  The region is a 
critical node on the intercontinental railway and interstate highway systems and 
Cleveland’s airport is the third hub in Continental Airline’s domestic route system.  Just 
to the south of Akron lies a second regional airport that offers limited competition and 
price discipline to Cleveland’s dominant air carrier.   
A number of factors converged during the 1960s to begin the pattern of migration 
out of the central cities: inter-urban electric trolleys disappeared and were replaced by 
limited access, high-speed highways; truck transportation became the dominant means of 
hauling finished goods; peoples’ wealth increased—enabling them to afford new housing; 
the central business districts of these cities have lost their dominant position as a location 
for retailing; and the ethnic concentration of the region’s large cities switched from 
predominately first and second-generation Central and Southern European ethnics to a 
mix of Appalachian whites and African-Americans.  The result of the population and 
employment migration out of Cleveland to the south, east, and west; out of Akron to the 
north, west, and east; and out of Lorain and Elyria to the east and south—all flowing 
along the interstate highway system—was the formation of integrated, region wide, labor, 
housing, and retail markets.  In other words, a group of quasi-autonomous cities located 
in the northeast corner of one of the larger states in the United States grew into a region 
that crosses eight counties.  It is an economic region that, while contained within one 
state, is not governed by a single local government. 
A range of statistical records is maintained for this broad economic region.  The 
largest piece of geography is the Cleveland-Akron Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (CMSA), which covers the functional regional economy. 2   The CMSA is, in turn, 
                                                 
2 In the United States local area statistics are collected for metropolitan areas, which are most often defined 
as a central city with a population of at least 50,000, the county it is located in (which is called the central 
county), and all surrounding counties where at least 15% of the employed population commute into the 
central county for work.  If rural counties surround the metropolitan area, it is termed a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA).  When two or more metropolitan areas abut, and workers stream into both central 
counties from at least one of the outlying counties, then each metropolitan area is termed a Primary 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) and the amalgamated urbanized area is termed a Consolidated 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA).  The PMSA where the city of Cleveland is located has three central 
cities: Cleveland, Lorain, and Elyria.  Akron is the center of the PMSA to Cleveland’s south.  These two 
PMSAs form the Cleveland-Akron CMSA.  See: Hill, Edward W., John Brennan, and Harold L. Wolman, 
“What is a Central City in the United States? Applying a statistical technique for developing taxonomies,” 
Urban Studies (November 1998) 35(11): 1935-1969. 
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composed of two smaller statistical units—the Cleveland Primary Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (PMSA) and Akron’s PMSA.  In 1990, the CMSA was home to 2,759,823 people 
living on 7,537 square kilometers, with an average population density of 366 people per 
square kilometer, or 948 per square mile.  The Cleveland PMSA, excluding Lorain and 
Elyria, is the largest component of the CMSA, and contained 2,344 square kilometers and 
1,831,122 people.3  The portion of Cleveland’s PMSA around Lorain and Elyria is home 
to 271,126 people, with a population density of 493 per square kilometer.  Akron’s 
PMSA has a population of 657,575 living on 2,344 square kilometers for an average 
density of 280 per square kilometer.  All of the cities in the CMSA with populations in 
excess of 50,00 are identified on Map 1, along with the boundaries of the eight counties 
in the CMSA.  The locations of the smaller cities in the CMSA are also outlined on the 
map. 
Northeast Ohio is typical of many major metropolitan areas in the Northeast and 
Midwestern United States.4 The region grew geographically and experienced a huge 
boom in suburban housing beginning in the 1950s, and continuing until the late 1970s.  
The growth pattern was triggered and sustained by several of what historian Robert 
Fishman called the ten top influences on the American metropolis over the past 50 years: 
the construction of interstate highways, the invention of the declining balance mortgage 
and the creation of secondary mortgage markets that lowered the effective cost and risk 
of homeownership, and the economic restructuring in the traditional heavy manufacturing 
industries in the 1970s and 1980s.5  
                                                 
3 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, Population and Housing Programs Branch, Table 1: Land Area, 
Population, and Density for States and Counties, 1990, www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/density.html 
 
4 Brennan, John and Edward W. Hill, “Where Are the Jobs?: Cities, Suburbs, and the Competition for 
Employment,” with John Brennan, Survey Series (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Center on 
Urban and Metropolitan Policy, November, 1999) http://www.brook.edu/es/urban/hillfa.pdf  
 
5 “The Top Ten Influences on the American Metropolis of the Past 50 Years: A Survey Conducted by 
Robert Fishman,” Housing Facts and Findings, Vol. 1, Number 4 (Winter, 1999) 
www.fanniemaefoundation.org/research/facts/wi99sl.html   
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Recent Economic History: The Comeback Region6 
Northeast Ohio reversed its two-decade-old pattern of population decline during 
the 1990s.  The estimated population of the CMSA increased from 1990 to 1998 by 1.8 
percent to 2.9 million people, after dropping by 2.7 percent from 1980 to 1990.  The 
Cleveland portion of the CMSA experienced a 0.9 percent increase in population while 
the Akron portion had a 4.8 percent increase.   Obviously there is shifting between the 
two portions of the CMSA taking place.  The most dramatic population change has been 
in the region’s four major cities (See Table 1).   
Table 1 
      
City Population Change in Northeast Ohio 
      
 Population Percent Change 
City 1998 1970 to 1980 1980 to 1990 1990 to 1998 1970 to 1998 
Cleveland 495,817 -23.6 -11.9 -1.9 -34.0 
Akron 215,712 -13.9 -6.0 -3.3 -21.7 
Lorain 68,857 -3.9 -5.5 -3.4 -12.3 
Elyria 56,278 7.3 -1.4 -0.8 4.9 
 
At the end of the Second World War the city of Cleveland had nearly one million 
residents; the population in 1998 was estimated to be about 495,000.  There was 
incredible crowding in the city’s housing stock in the immediate post-war period, thus the 
initial movement to the suburbs, with the accompanying decreases in the city’s 
population, was socially desirable.  The early suburban migration was a reflection of new 
households spilling across city borders, taking advantage of innovations in housing 
finance and cheaper construction techniques to raise their families in more affordable 
housing.  This early migration was a push from a crowded nest.   
                                                 
6 See Hill, Edward W., “Cleveland, Ohio: Manufacturing Matters; Services Are Strengthened; But Earnings 
Erode,” (p. 103-140) and Shanahan, James L. and W. Richard Goe, “Akron: Ohio: Regional Economy at 
the Turning Point,” (p.9-46) in Richard D. Bingham and Randall W. Eberts (eds.) Economic Restructuring 
of the American Midwest, Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1988; Hill, Edward W. “The Cleveland 
Economy: A Case Study of Economic Restructuring, in W.Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz and David 
Perry (eds.) Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press,1995): 53-86; and 
Hill, Edward W., “Comeback Cleveland by the Numbers: The Economy, Employment and Education,” in 
David Sweet, David Beech, and Kathryn Wertheim Hexter (eds.) The New American City Looks to its 
Regional Future (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1999): 77-100. 
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The migration did not stop in the early post-war years, and its consequences 
became less benign for the region’s core cities, although these movements did improve 
the individual welfare of those that moved and their families.  From 1970 to 1998, 
Cleveland’s population dropped by 34 percent, while Akron’s population decreased by 
nearly 22 percent.  This migration had two components.  The first was a flight from 
racially integrating schools.  The second was a movement toward a set of residential 
services that were considered by the movers to be superior to those services available in 
the central city for the same tax cost.  What is encouraging is the notable slowing of 
population loss during the 1990s, especially in the city of Cleveland.7  This is an 
indication that either all those who could afford to move have done so, or that the 
region’s core cities are offering services and amenities that can compete for residents 
who have choices. 
Examining a region’s annual unemployment rate relative to the national average 
unemployment rate is a good near-term barometer of the performance of the regional 
economy.  These data are plotted in Figure 1 for 1972 to 1998, where the unemployment 
rate in the CMSA is subtracted from the national rate and the difference in the two rates 
is plotted.  If the unemployment rate in the Cleveland-Akron Consolidated Metropolitan 
Area is greater than the national unemployment rate then the difference is positive and 
the line will be above the X-axis of the graph.  The graph depicts five periods in the 
recent economic history of the Cleveland-Akron region.  From 1972 to 1979 the 
unemployment rate for the CMSA was cyclical and more volatile than the national 
average unemployment rate, responding vigorously to the recession of the mid-1970s.  
Unemployment in the 1976 recession was disproportionately concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector; this was a precursor to the fundamental restructuring that took 
place from 1979 to 1983.  The economy crashed in 1979, bottomed out in 1983, and then 
began an unsteady recovery until 1985 to 1986.  The recovery was firmly established 
after 1986.  The unemployment rate for the nation was significantly below that of both 
the CMSA and state for a decade, from 1979 to 1989.  
                                                 
7 This pattern is repeated in a number of older, formerly industrial cities in the United States, see the special 
issue of the Brookings Review (Summer 2000) on U.S. urban policy: 
http://www.brook.edu/press/review/rev_des.htm  
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Figure 1
Percentage Point Difference Between the CM SA’s Annual Unemployment Rate and the National 
Rate: 1972 to 1998
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Generally, the unemployment rate for the CMSA was below the national rate from 1988 
on, marking the economic “comeback” of Northeast Ohio.  Movements in the 
unemployment rate mark four of the five periods of recent economic history; the fifth 
period is more evident when employment figures are examined (Figure 2).   
An employment growth index for the Cleveland-Akron CMSA (the solid dark 
line), the nation (the dashed dark line), Akron’s PMSA (the lighter dotted line), and 
Cleveland’s PMSA (the darker dotted line) are plotted in Figure 2.  The index is 
benchmarked to the level of employment in 1979 because it is the region’s peak level of 
employment before the intense period of restructuring took place from 1979 to 1985 
(1979 marks the end of what we termed the “old economic order”8).  Therefore, when the 
index has a value of 100, employment is at the same level as it was in 1979.   
 
                                                 
8 Hill, Edward W. , “The Cleveland Economy: A Case Study of Economic Restructuring”, in W. Dennis 
Keating, Norman Krumholz and  David Perry (eds.) Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader (Kent, OH: Kent 
State University Press, 1995): 53-86.   
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Figure 2
Employment Grow th Index for the US, Cleveland-Akron CM SA, Cleveland PM SA, and 
Akron PM SA: 1972 to 1998
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The employment growth index follows the pattern exhibited in the previous figure 
for the first four periods.  The employment index for the region bottomed out in 1983 
then grew at a steady pace until 1989.  Employment growth recovered more quickly in 
the Akron PMSA than in the Cleveland PMSA over this time period, marking the 
emergence of northern Summit County (the county that contains Akron and the place 
where the suburbs of both Cleveland and Akron abut) as one of the region’s population 
and employment growth spots.   Summit County is a prime destination of employers and 
households who have been moving out of the Cleveland PMSA, mostly from Cleveland’s 
inner-ring suburbs.  The fifth period of the region’s recent economic history became 
evident with the mild recession that began in 1989.  Employment growth has been largely 
anemic from 1989 to 1998 in the Cleveland PMSA, and the growth rate in the entire 
CMSA has been modest. 
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The Cleveland-Akron Economy 
In 1997, the Cleveland-Akron Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area had a Gross 
Metropolitan Product (GMP) between $93.0 and $93.2 billion.9  In size, this economy is 
between Ireland’s and Finland’s; it is a bit smaller than the San Jose metropolitan area 
($96 billion) and a little more than half the size of southeast Michigan (the Detroit, Flint, 
and Ann Arbor metropolitan areas).  Per capita income in 1998 was $29,239 in the 
Cleveland PMSA and $26,934 in Akron’s PMSA, which is higher than the per capita 
income of any European nation.10   
 Despite the swings in employment the region has experienced over the past two 
decades, real (inflation adjusted) Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) has not had a 
significant downturn after the economy bottomed out in 1983 (Figure 3).   
F ig u re  3
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9 This is between $86 billion and $87 billion in 1992 dollars. 
 
10 The estimates of Gross Metropolitan Product are from the Urban Center, Cleveland State University.  We 
estimate GMP by taking the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
estimates of Gross State Product (GSP) and multiply that number by the CMSA’s share of state personal 
income (also obtained from the BEA).  We use the same method to estimate the region’s share of 
manufacturing’s contribution to GSP.  We obtain these data from: www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/.    
Estimates of per capita personal income are from www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/bearfacts/. The data on 
European economies are 1997 and 1998 estimates from the World Economic Factbook, 1999 produced by 
the CIA and available from Global Statistics: http://www.xist.org/countries/countries.htm . 
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Despite the major restructuring experienced by the region’s manufacturing firms and 
plants, manufacturing’s contribution to GMP only declined in the 1989-1992 recession.  
The enormity of this fact is made clear by the fact that manufacturing employment in the 
Cleveland PMSA dropped by 28 percent from 1979 to 1987.  Akron’s PMSA witnessed a 
23 percent loss in manufacturing employment over the same time period.  In 1983, the 
real value of manufacturing GMP was $16.2 billion in 1992 dollars.  In 1997, 
manufacturing’s contribution to GMP was $23.2 billion in 1992 dollars.  Coming out of 
the most recent recession, manufacturing’s share of GMP increased from 25.3 percent of 
GMP to a peak of 27.2 percent in 1996, dropping to 26.9 percent in 1997. 
 
The Location of Work 
The fact that the region is a highly integrated economy is evident from the second 
map, which depicts employment per square mile in 1998 plotted by zip code areas.11  The 
densest areas of employment are colored in black (with more than 2,500 private sector 
employees per square mile), followed by dark gray (1,500 to 2,500 per square mile), 
medium gray (500 to 1,500 per square mile), and light gray (from 0 to 500 per square 
mile).  The densest areas of employment are within the cities of Cleveland and Akron 
(both are outlined in dashed white lines), and in two well-recognized regional “edge 
cities.”12  One of these edge cities is at the intersection of two interstate highways—the 
major north-south highway between Cleveland and Akron and the other is the region’s 
major east-west connector.  The second edge city is located in the high-status, high-
income eastern suburbs of Cleveland, which has attracted a number of major corporate 
headquarters.  The next densest areas of employment are in a set of municipalities that 
follow the highway system around Cleveland and are in the city of Akron and one of its 
suburbs.
                                                 
11 These are postal delivery codes that are smaller than municipalities and cover fairly homogeneous areas. 
 
12 Bingham et al., Beyond Edge Cities (NY: Garland Publishing, 1997). 
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Map 2
Employment per Square Mile
by ZIP code, for 1998
Greater than 2,500
1,500  to 2,500
500  to 1,500
0 to 500
Not in the CMSA
Employment Density for All Industries 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA,
1998
Source: ES-202, The Urban Center, Cleveland State University
 
The location of the 44 corporate and divisional headquarters of firms with more 
than $500 million in revenues in 1998 is provided in Table 2.  The table shows that the 
city of Cleveland is the location of 16 of these headquarters, a bit more than one-third of 
the total.  Akron is home to four of the firms, including Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company—the region’s largest firm.  The others are located in various suburbs along the 
interstate highway network.  GenCorp is in Akron’s edge city of Fairlawn, near where 
Goodrich was headquartered before moving to Charlotte, North Carolina.   
 It is clear from the data presented in Table 2 that business locations near a major 
airport, or in the central business district in one of the region’s major cities, is not a 
competitive imperative in an era of global competition and a highly mobile workforce.  
 11
Location in a “nice” working environment near the exit ramp of a limited access highway 
is a more important means of attracting a workforce.13   
Table 2 
Corporate Headquarters in Northeast Ohio with 1998 Revenues Above $500 Million 
Rank by       
Revenue Firm City Industry or Product 
1 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Akron Rubber/Chemicals 
2 TRW, Inc. Cleveland Motor vehicle parts 
3 National City Corp Cleveland Banking 
4 Keycorp Cleveland Banking 
5 Eaton Corp Cleveland Motor vehicle parts 
6 FirstEnergy Akron Electric utility 
7 Progressive Corp Mayfield Heights Insurance 
8 Sherwin-Williams Co Cleveland Chemicals 
9 Parker Hannifin Corp Mayfield Heights Fluid power systems 
10 OfficeMax Shaker Heights National office supplies retail 
11 LTV Cleveland Metals 
12 B.F. Goodrich* Richfield Aerospace parts 
13 Roadway Express Akron Trucking 
14 NACCO Industries Mayfield Heights Industrial trucks & tractors 
15 M.A. Hanna Cleveland Plastics 
16 American Greetings Brooklyn Greeting cards 
17 Pioneer Standard Electronics Garfield Heights Electronics distribution 
18 GenCorp Fairlawn Aerospace & automotive parts 
19 RPM, Inc Medina Paints & coatings 
20 Lubrizol Wickliffe Specialty chemicals 
21 Applied Industrial Tech Cleveland Industrial products 
22 Ferro Corp Cleveland Specialty chemicals 
23 Geon Co Westlake Plastics 
24 Jo Ann Stores Hudson National fabric & craft retail 
25 Lincoln Electric Co Euclid Motors & generators 
26 Cole National Corp Cleveland National optical retailing 
27 MTD Products Strongsville Lawn tools 
28 A. Schulman Inc Akron Plastics 
29 Travelcenters, Inc Westlake Highway rest stop facilities 
30 Charter One Financial Cleveland Banking 
31 International Management Inc Cleveland Sports management & marketing 
32 Westfield Companies Westfield Center Insurance 
33 Spitzer Management Elyria Regional automotive retail 
34 Invacare Corp Elyria Medical instruments 
35 Steris Corp Mentor Electro medical equipment 
36 Great Lakes Cheese Co Hiram Cheese/food production 
37 Forest City Enterprises Cleveland Real estate development 
38 Nordson Corp Westlake Adhesives and coatings 
39 NCS Healthcare Cleveland Skilled nursing facilities 
40 Olympic Steel, Inc Bedford Heights Steel service center 
41 Cater Jones, Inc Kent Regional lumber retail 
42 The Richard F. Jacobs Group Westlake Real estate development 
43 Park-Ohio Holdings Cleveland Manufacturing 
44 OM Group Cleveland Agricultural chemicals 
Source: Greater Cleveland Growth Association, Fortune, Crain's Cleveland Business, and the Plain Dealer 
                                                 
13 See: Cohen, Natalie, “Business Location Decision-Making and the Cities: Brining Companies Back,” 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Center for Urban and Metropolitan Policy, April, 2000) 
www.brook.edu/urban/ 
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Both competitive and regional realities are evident from the location of 
employment in the Cleveland-Akron CMSA.  The data displayed in Table 3 on the 
location of private sector employment by postal zip code were used to examine the 
locations of work in the Cleveland-Akron CMSA in 1997.14  Employment in the 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA is predominantly located in the suburbs of the two major central 
cities.  Nearly 70 percent of all private sector employment is suburbanized and the 
majority of that employment (40 percent of the total) is located in the suburbs that 
experienced their greatest growth spurt immediately after the Second World War.  A 
string of recently developed suburbs, which now contain 12.6 percent of the region’s 
employment, connects the Akron and Cleveland PMSAs. 
T a b le  3
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The data in Table 3 and in Map 2 show that portions of Cleveland and Akron’s 
central cities outside of the central business districts are important nodes of employment 
in their own right. Both Cleveland and Akron have large manufacturing and distribution 
employment bases within their borders.  Additionally, not all suburbs are well off.  
Nearly 10 percent of the region’s employment is located in distressed suburbs.  One of 
                                                 
14 The data are from Brennan, John and Edward W. Hill “Employment Specialization Within Ohio’s 
Metropolitan Areas,” in Brennan and Hill (Eds.) Where Is The Renaissance? Examining the Competitive 
Advantage of America’s Cities in the Competition for Work (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 
forthcoming).  These data are from unemployment compensation tax payments made by employers to the 
state of Ohio.  The data are aggregated to the zip code level so that the identity of specific establishments 
are not be revealed. 
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these suburbs is a low-income inner-ring suburb that is an extension of Cleveland’s 
African-American poverty area.  Two are older industrial cities in the Cleveland PMSA 
that have been engulfed by the spread of the region’s geography. 
Maps 3 to 7 depict the employment densities of the major private industrial 
sectors in the region.  Map 3 is of the density of manufacturing employment.  The densest 
concentrations are in the city of Cleveland, where the density is in excess of 530 jobs per 
square mile.  This density is maintained in the eastern suburbs of Solon and Euclid and in 
the western city of Elyria and a portion of Akron.  The next level of density is between 
320 and 530 jobs per square mile.  These zip codes are concentrated in the southeastern 
suburbs of Cleveland and parts of Akron.  Capital and technology-intensive 
manufacturing is the competitive advantage of the Cleveland-Akron regional economy. 
Map 3
Employment per Square Mile
by Zip Code, for 1998
Greater than 530
320  to 530
105  to 320
0 to 105
Not in the CMSA
Employment Density for Manufacturing Sector 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA,
1998
Source: ES-202, The Urban Center, Cleveland State University
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Map 4
Employment Density for Business 
Services Sector 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA,
1998
Employment per Square Mile
by ZIP code, for 1998
Greater than 205
125  to 205
40  to 125
0  to 40
Not in CMSA
Source: ES-202, T he Urban Center, Cleveland State University
 
Map 5
Employment Density for Nonfinancial 
Producer Services Sector 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA,
1998
Employment per Square Mile
by ZIP code, for 1998
Greater than 120
70  to 120
25  to 70
0 to 25
Not in CMSA
Source: ES-202, The Urban Center, Cleveland State University
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Map 6
Employment per Square Mile
by ZIP code, for 1998
Greater than 100
60 to 100
20 to 60
0 to 20
Not in CMSA
Employment Density for Financial 
Producer Services Sector 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA,
1998
Source: ES-202, The Urban Center, Cleveland State University
 
Map 7
Employment per Square Mile
by ZIP code, for 1998
Greater than 210
125  to 210
40  to 125
0 to 40
Not in CMSA
Employment Density for Tourism 
Services Sector 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA,
1998
Source: ES-202, The Urban Center, Cleveland State University
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 The region is arguably one of the nations’ and world’s centers of capital and 
technology-intensive manufacturing excellence.  It has demonstrated a competitive 
advantage in steel and metalworking, specialty chemicals (especially paints and 
coatings), automotive parts and assembly, plastic products, and insurance.15  Local 
economic development efforts have identified emerging areas of competitive advantage 
in the instruments and industrial controls industry (especially in the area of factory 
automation), the medical implements and device industry (an industry with an established 
corporate base that utilizes the region’s machining tradition and the new-found 
prominence of several of the region’s hospital complexes in medical research), and 
possibly in the lighting industry.  A common technological thread tying together the 
plastics products industry with paints, coatings, and roofing is basic research in polymer 
chemistry.  It is important to understand that the competitive foundation of the economy 
is region wide.  Research and development efforts in the polymer industry are 
concentrated near the city of Akron because of the historical legacy of the region’s tire 
and rubber companies and the research prominence of the University of Akron’s Edison 
Program in Polymer Research.  The metals industry, along with associated machining and 
tool and die plants are scattered throughout the region—as are plastics products 
industries.  Paints and chemicals industries and corporate headquarters are 
disproportionately located in Cleveland and its suburbs.    
Interviews conducted with industrial site location consultants led to the 
conclusion that the region is viewed as an integrative whole by the business, or facility, 
location market.  The excellence of highway and rail transport networks shifts the 
locational calculus to the availability of land and buildings along with a supply of labor 
and away from access to any particular place within the region.  This means that local 
governments are very competitive when it comes to attracting industry from both inside 
and outside of the region because none can expect to have an advantage in the 
competition.  The competitive nature of recruiting wars is enhanced by the fact that local 
                                                 
15 Hill, Edward W. and John Brennan, “A Methodology for Identifying the Drivers of Industrial Clusters: 
The foundation of regional competitive advantage,” Economic Development Quarterly (February 2000) 
14(1): 65-96. 
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governments benefit from both municipal income taxes and property taxes that are 
assessed on buildings, equipment, and inventory.   
The density of business service employment (Map 4) shows the competitive 
position of the central cities. The largest concentrations of zip codes with the highest 
densities (in excess of 205 employees per square mile) are in the two major cities, but the 
“edge cities” to south and east of Cleveland and to Akron’s immediate north in the city of 
Fairlawn are evident.  This competitive pattern holds for the density of nonfinancial 
producer services (Map 5) and financial producer services (Map 6).   A break in the 
dominant pattern is evident in the density of employment in the tourism services sector 
(Map 7), which is driven to a large extent by restaurant employment.  The densest 
concentration is in Cleveland, with a density that exceeds 210 employees per square mile 
in the central business district and riverfront entertainment district, with similar densities 
existing in Akron near its university. 
 
Employment Market Share  
One way of gauging the competitive position of cities is to examine the share of 
the metropolitan market for private sector employment that is located within their 
borders.16  The city of Cleveland contained 28 percent of the private sector employment 
in the Cleveland PMSA in 1997 and Akron accounted for nearly 36 percent of 
employment in its PMSA.  (Table 4)  The two cities account for nearly 30 percent of total 
employment in the CMSA.  However, their share of the regional employment market has 
dropped during the recent business cycle recovery.  Northeast Ohio’s two major central 
cities compare favorably with similar cities in the northeastern and midwestern United 
States. 
 The data in Table 4 are listed for most of the metropolitan areas in the Northeast 
and Midwest that have a central city that is among the 100 largest in the nation.  The 
metropolitan areas are arrayed in the table according to their 1997 employment market 
share.  If the data system lists two central cities in the same metropolitan area, then both  
                                                 
16 We use private sector employment for two reasons.  The first is practical.  The special abstract from 
County Business Patterns that is part of the State of the Cities Data System (SOCDS) covers only private 
sector employers who pay Social Security taxes.  The second reason is that private sector jobs are located 
for competitive reasons while public sector jobs locate due to a mix of market and political influences. 
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 Table 4 
Central City Market Share of the Metropolitan Private Employment 
Market in 1992 and 1997 for Large Northeast-Midwestern Cities 
Ranked by 1997 Market Share 
  Central City Share of Change in 
  Private Employment Share 
Central City State 1992 1997 1992-1997 
Indianapolis IN 69.7 69.9 0.19 
Madison WI 67.9 64.2 -3.69 
Columbus OH 55.7 54.4 -1.27 
Fort Wayne IN 56.7 53.9 -2.86 
Toledo OH 55.9 51.9 -3.99 
Kansas City-Kansas City MO-KS 48.2 44.4 -3.81 
Kansas City MO 39.5 36.9 -2.63 
Kansas City KS 8.6 7.5 -1.18 
Louisville KY 46.5 41.2 -5.27 
Rochester NY 42.9 39.9 -3.03 
Milwaukee WI 41.1 36.9 -4.12 
Cincinnati OH 40.4 33.6 -6.71 
Chicago IL 35.0 32.1 -2.86 
Wilmington DE 27.3 31.8 4.50 
Buffalo NY 35.2 31.7 -3.56 
Pittsburgh PA 31.8 30.9 -0.94 
Baltimore MD 32.9 30.5 -2.44 
Minneapolis-St. Paul MN 35.3 30.5 -4.75 
Minneapolis MN 22.0 19.0 -3.03 
St. Paul MN 13.3 11.6 -1.72 
Cleveland-Akron CMSA OH 32.0 29.8 -2.20 
Cleveland OH 29.8 28.0 -1.80 
Akron OH 39.7 35.8 -3.84 
Philadelphia PA 30.0 27.9 -2.04 
Providence RI 27.6 26.6 -1.05 
Grand Rapids MI 31.6 25.9 -5.67 
Dayton OH 29.0 25.9 -3.10 
Boston NECMA MA-NH 23.6 23.4 -0.21 
Boston MA 18.0 18.0 -0.03 
Worcester MA 3.5 3.3 -0.15 
Manchester NH 2.1 2.1 -0.04 
St. Louis MO 24.6 23.3 -1.34 
Hartford CT 22.8 20.2 -2.62 
Detroit MI 16.2 13.8 -2.39 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, SOCDS 
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are shown and their employment is totaled to reflect major central city employment in 
that metropolitan area.  This is the case for the Boston region, Kansas City, and 
Minneapolis-St. Paul.  The data for the Cleveland and Akron PMSAs are reported 
separately and then totaled to reflect the CMSA.  In most cases there are other central 
cities in the metropolitan areas.  Employment in these smaller central cities is not 
reported because these are not among the 100 largest in the United States.17   
The three central cities with the largest market shares of employment in the 
Midwest are state capitals and they also have large portions of their metropolitan area’s 
land areas.  Yet even Madison, Wisconsin and Columbus, Ohio lost market share over the 
past five years to their suburbs.  Most of the other central cities on the list contain 
between 30 and 40 percent of their region’s employment.  Cleveland and Akron appear to 
be representative of these cities.    
The low rate of employment creation over this five-year period is of greater 
concern than declining market share.  Table 5 lists the private sector employment growth 
rates in the central cities and suburbs of the same metropolitan areas as listed in Table 4.  
The metropolitan areas are listed in order of the differences in their central city and 
suburban employment growth rates.  The city listed first, Wilmington, Delaware, 
experienced a 32.2 percent central city employment growth rate and a 6.4 percent 
suburban rate, for a city-suburban differential of 25.7 percentage points.  The city of 
Cleveland had a city growth rate of 2.9 percent over the five-year period, and a suburban 
rate of 12.3 percent for a negative 9.4 percentage point differential.  This placed it eighth 
among the cities listed.  Akron fared much less well.  Its central city employment growth 
rate was similar to that of Cleveland’s, at 2.5 percent, but its suburbs grew at a much 
faster rate than did Cleveland’s suburbs.  As we mentioned earlier this reflects the 
regionalization of the economy. 
 During the most recent stage of the business cycle, Akron and Cleveland have 
managed to stabilize their population losses and remain competitive in the regional  
                                                 
17 Employment for these smaller central cities is included in the suburban employment total for the 
metropolitan area.  For example, the Cleveland PMSA has two additional central cities, Elyria and Lorain; 
their employment figures are part of the suburban totals.  Additionally, Cleveland has one extremely poor 
suburb, East Cleveland, and the city of Euclid, which was once considered to be a central city.  
Employment in both of these places is part of the “suburban” totals.  New York City, Newark, and Jersey 
City were omitted from Table 4 because data for other PMSAs in the New York CMSA are not available. 
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Table 5 
Suburban and Central City Private Employment Growth Rates for 
Large Northeast-Midwestern MSAs: 1992 to 1997 
Ranked by the Size of the Difference in City and Suburban Rates 
  Employment Percentage  
  Growth Rates Percentage 
  1992 to 1997 Point 
  Central  Difference 
Central City State City Suburb (City - Suburb) 
Wilmington DE 32.2 6.4 25.7 
Indianapolis IN 14.0 12.9 1.0 
Boston NECMA MA-NH 11.3 12.6 -1.3 
Boston MA 12.1   
Worcester MA 7.4   
Manchester NH 10.3   
Pittsburgh PA 3.1 7.7 -4.6 
Providence RI 1.8 7.3 -5.5 
Columbus OH 14.1 20.2 -6.0 
St. Louis MO 4.9 12.9 -8.0 
Cleveland OH 2.9 12.3 -9.4 
Philadelphia PA 0.5 11.0 -10.5 
Rochester NY -4.5 8.2 -12.7 
Baltimore MD 1.4 13.5 -12.1 
Fort Wayne IN 7.4 20.6 -13.2 
Chicago IL 0.6 14.4 -13.8 
Hartford CT -11.5 3.3 -14.8 
Buffalo NY -8.7 7.1 -15.9 
Dayton OH -1.4 15.3 -16.6 
Kansas City-Kansas City MO-KS 5.8 23.3 -17.5 
Kansas City MO 7.2   
Kansas City KS -0.7   
Toledo OH 4.3 22.5 -18.2 
Akron OH 2.5 20.7 -18.2 
Milwaukee WI -1.4 17.2 -18.6 
Detroit MI -1.5 18.9 -20.4 
Madison WI 13.9 34.3 -20.4 
Louisville KY 2.9 27.5 -24.6 
Minneapolis-St. Paul MN 2.3 26.9 -24.6 
Minneapolis MN 1.9   
St. Paul MN 2.9   
Cincinnati OH -6.3 25.1 -31.4 
Grand Rapids MI 0.6 32.7 -32.2 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, SOCDS  
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competition for employment, but much of the region’s meager employment growth is 
locating in a series of “edge cities” at the intersection of interstate highways.  The 
economy is spreading across larger portions of the landscape; however, in so doing it 
may be gaining production efficiencies because the region’s competitive advantage lies in 
high value-added manufacturing. 
 
Technologically Intensive Employment 
Much local commentary about the economy bemoans the weakness of the 
region’s “high-technology” sector.  Part of this keening is economically rational, because 
rapid employment growth and new spurts of wealth creation take place more easily in an 
economy that is generating new products—goods and services that are in the early stages 
of the product life cycle.  The products and the companies of Northeast Ohio are in the 
middle of their product life cycles.  However, there is a confusion in these “high tech” 
arguments that is common in “pop economics.”   In today’s excitement over the prospects 
and realities of the “new economy” and the frenzy over the impact of high technology 
industries on society, an important analytical step has been missing—agreement about the 
phenomena being discussed.  There appear to be as many definitions of high technology 
industries as there are analysts.  The common conception of high technology is an 
amalgam of information technology industries, computer and software industries, and 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.  This definition is clearly too limited.  A 
second common mistake in conceptualizing high technology industries is to confuse the 
technological content of the product with new products—goods and services that have 
been recently created and are in the early stages of the product life cycle.  Both of these 
approaches leave out products that are intense users of technology but lie outside of these 
common frames of understanding, such as chemicals, petroleum, and automobile 
production.   In the case of Northeast Ohio and its core cities of Akron and Cleveland, the 
challenge is to adopt information technologies into existing products and processes to 
reinvigorate products and to increase the value of these products. 
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Daniel Hecker defined high tech industries according to the characteristics of an 
industry’s work force.18  An industry was considered to be high tech if “employment in 
both research and development and in all technology-oriented occupations accounted for 
a proportion of employment that was at least twice the average for all industries in the 
Occupational Employment Statistics survey…These industries have at least 6 research 
and development workers per thousand workers and 76 technology-oriented workers per 
thousand workers.”  Hecker identifies two groups of high technology industries.   The 
first is a set of 10 high-technology intensive industries where both ratios are at least five 
times the national average.  These include eight manufacturing industries and two service 
industries: industrial chemicals; drugs; computer and office equipment; electronic 
components; aerospace; search and navigation equipment; measuring and control 
devices; computer and data processing services; and research and development testing 
services.  The next set of two service industries and 17 manufacturing industries meet his 
criteria but are rarely part of any list of “new economy” companies or products.19  The 
importance of Hecker’s research for the Cleveland-Akron CMSA is that a large portion 
of this second list of industries is contained in the region’s demonstrated competitive 
advantage.20  There is reason to believe that the region specializes in products that are 
intense users of technology, but the products in these industries are not infant products. 
Kurt Usowski, of the Office of Policy Development and Research of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, has made an important step in cutting 
through the analytical clutter by providing a definition of a high technology industry that 
is both rigorous and driven by revealed preferences—high technology industries are 
defined by the way narrowly defined industries use specific types of occupations that are 
the developers and users of technology.  Usowski builds upon Hecker’s research, but the 
                                                 
18 Hecker, Daniel, “High-technology Employment: A Broader View,” Monthly Labor Review (June, 1999): 
18-28. 
 
19 These industries are: plastics materials and synthetics; soaps, cleaners and toilet goods; paint and allied 
products; agricultural chemicals; miscellaneous chemical processes; petroleum refining; ordnance and 
accessories; engines and turbines; construction and related machinery; special industrial machinery; general 
industrial machinery; electric distribution equipment; household audio and video equipment; motor 
vehicles and equipment; medical equipment, instruments and supplies; photographic equipment and 
supplies; engineering and architectural services; and management and public relations services. 
 
20 See Hill and Brennan, Economic Development Quarterly, op. cit. 
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data he uses allows for the estimation of technology-intense production at the city and 
metropolitan level.   Usowski examined the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for 
detailed occupational descriptions that contained key words associated with rapidly 
evolving technology (he examined more than 12,700 titles).21  He then aggregated the 
data into nearly 500 non-governmental occupations.  If more than half of the detailed 
occupations in each of the 500 aggregated occupation category contained one of the 
technology key words then the aggregated occupation was classified as being technology 
intensive.  These occupations were used with an industry-occupation matrix to determine 
the proportion of each industry’s work force that is technology intensive.  This estimated 
“technological proportion of employment” was then used to compute the number of 
technologically intense workers in each industry in each location in the County Business 
Patterns extract in the State of the Cities Data System (SOCDS), assuming that the 
proportion was constant across all metropolitan areas.  Even though healthcare 
employment is technologically intense, the health services industry (SIC 80) was 
excluded because it serves a predominantly local population and the implicit interest in 
high technology industries is to promote a set of industries that can become part of the 
region’s export base. 
Table 6 replicates a portion of the output from Usowski’s work, as modified by 
the Urban Center at the Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University.  
The table reports on the fraction of all private sector positions that are technologically 
intense in a metropolitan area and then in the central city of the metropolitan area.  We 
next calculated the central city’s share of metropolitan private employment and of 
technological employment, and then the central city’s location quotient (LQ) of 
technological employment.  The LQ was calculated to determine if technologically 
intense work is disproportionately located in central cities or not.   If the LQ is greater 
than 1.0, then technologically intense work is disproportionately city-based; if it is equal 
to 1.0 it is proportionate to the city’s market share of private employment; and if it is less 
than 1.0 the city’s share of technologically intense employment is less than its share of 
total private employment.   
                                                 
21 The key words are: tech, engineer, architect, data, computer, communication, analyst, network, electro, 
aero, math, design, programmer, drafter, research, bio, chemist, and science and its derivatives. (Usowski, 
May 23, 2000, personal communication). 
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Table 6 
The Specialization of Central Cities in Technologically Intensive Employment 
(technologically intensive does not include employment in the medical industries, SIC 80) 
  Technology-Intensive 1997 City Market Share Location 
  Share of   Technology Quotient 
  Private Employment Private Intensive Technology 
Metropolitan Area Metro Area Central City Employment Employment Employment 
Cleveland-Akron 6.7% 6.3% 29.7% 28.0% 0.94 
Akron 6.1% 5.1% 35.8% 30.1% 0.84 
Cleveland 6.9% 6.8% 28.0% 27.5% 0.98 
All Areas Total 7.0% 6.9% 43.0% 41.9% 0.97 
Atlanta 6.5% 6.9% 19.9% 21.1% 1.06 
Austin-San Antonio 7.6% 7.5% 79.3% 78.2% 0.99 
Austin 9.5% 9.5% 73.7% 73.6% 1.00 
San Antonio 6.1% 6.1% 83.8% 84.0% 1.00 
Boston NECMA 8.6% 8.0% 18.0% 16.8% 0.93 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 7.0% 7.0% 19.0% 19.0% 1.00 
San Francisco CMSA 8.9% 8.1% 36.8% 33.3% 0.90 
Oakland 7.4% 5.8% 17.2% 13.5% 0.78 
San Francisco 7.0% 6.9% 55.3% 54.1% 0.98 
San Jose 12.3% 11.0% 36.3% 32.3% 0.89 
Portland, Oregon 7.0% 6.8% 43.5% 42.0% 0.97 
Baltimore 6.8% 6.8% 30.5% 30.4% 1.00 
Buffalo 6.4% 6.0% 31.7% 29.7% 0.94 
Charlotte 6.5% 7.0% 52.9% 57.2% 1.08 
Chicago 7.3% 7.3% 32.1% 32.2% 1.00 
Cincinnati 6.6% 6.8% 33.6% 35.0% 1.04 
Columbus, Ohio 6.0% 5.9% 54.4% 53.2% 0.98 
Dayton 7.4% 7.2% 25.9% 25.1% 0.97 
Detroit 6.4% 6.4% 13.8% 13.8% 1.00 
Fort Wayne 7.5% 6.7% 53.9% 47.8% 0.89 
Grand Rapids 6.7% 6.8% 25.9% 26.0% 1.01 
Hartford 7.2% 7.0% 20.2% 19.8% 0.98 
Indianapolis 6.1% 6.0% 69.9% 67.8% 0.97 
Louisville 6.1% 5.9% 41.2% 39.9% 0.97 
Milwaukee 7.7% 7.7% 36.9% 37.1% 1.00 
Philadelphia 7.5% 7.6% 27.9% 28.6% 1.02 
Pittsburgh 6.8% 7.6% 30.9% 34.7% 1.12 
Providence 6.7% 7.7% 26.6% 30.4% 1.15 
Rochester, New York 8.9% 11.0% 39.9% 49.3% 1.24 
St. Louis 6.7% 7.5% 23.3% 25.9% 1.11 
Toledo 6.4% 5.9% 51.9% 48.1% 0.93 
Wilmington, DE 6.1% 5.2% 31.8% 26.9% 0.85 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, State of the Cities Data Systems,  
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The table is divided into three sections.  The first reports the results of the 
calculations for the Cleveland-Akron CMSA, the Cleveland PMSA, and the Akron 
PMSA.  Most of the results are for MSAs or PMSAs.  In a few cases where all of the 
components of the CMSA were reported in the database and the consolidated 
metropolitan area is relevant to Northeast Ohio, they are reported in Table 6.  The second 
section of the table consists of the national average across all of the 114 metropolitan 
areas in the SOCDS and of a group of metropolitan areas that have a reputation of being 
hot beds of “high technology” employment: Atlanta, Austin-San Antonio, Boston, 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, the San Francisco CMSA, and Portland, Oregon.  The third section 
of the table reports the results for metropolitan areas located in the Northeast and 
Midwest that are similar to the Akron or Cleveland PMSAs. 
 Concerns that Northeast Ohio is not a high technology economy are misplaced.  It 
is not a new product economy and the industries in which it has a competitive advantage 
are intense users of technological occupations.  This is evidenced by the close 
correspondence between the industries in the region’s competitive clusters and the 
industries in Hecker’s list of “other high technology” industries.  The region is lacking in 
a competitive base of industries that Hecker identifies as “high technology intense.” 
The SOCDS data show that both the Cleveland PMSA and the city of Cleveland 
are near the U.S. average for large metropolitan areas in the proportion of the private 
sector workforce employed in non-medical, technologically intense industries.  The 
location quotient for the city of Cleveland is 0.98, which is near the national average LQ 
of 0.97 and is higher than a number of central cities in metropolitan areas that have 
achieved reputations as high technology hot spots—the three central cities in the Boston 
region have an LQ of 0.93 and San Jose has a technology LQ of 0.89.  The only central 
city with a LQ much higher than Cleveland’s is Atlanta, even though Atlanta has a 
smaller share of its metropolitan and central city employment in technologically intense 
industries.  The major difference between the Cleveland PMSA and the other high 
technology hot spots is the share of metropolitan private employment in technology 
intensive industries.  Only four of the technological hot spots have much larger 
proportions of metropolitan private employment in technologically intense industries than 
does the Cleveland PMSA—Austin at 9.5 percent, Boston at 8.5 percent, Oakland at 7.4 
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percent, and San Jose at 12.3 percent.  Only seven of the 21 metropolitan areas in the 
third section of Table 6 have seven percent or more of their employment in 
technologically intense industries: Chicago, Dayton, Fort Wayne, Hartford, Milwaukee, 
Philadelphia, and Rochester, New York.  Ten of these central cities have larger shares of 
their employment base in technologically intense industries than does the city of 
Cleveland.   
An inspection of the data in the lower portion of Table 6 reveals an unexpected 
result, assuming that the conventional wisdom is correct that a concentration of 
employment in technologically intense industries is unambiguously desirable:  Many of 
the metropolitan areas and central cities with greater concentrations of employment in 
technologically intense industries have performed worse than Cleveland in terms of 
employment generation.  The lesson to be learned is that technological intensity does not 
drive economies—products, product innovation, business strategies, and sales are the 
drivers.22  
The technological drag on the Cleveland-Akron CMSA is located in the fastest 
growing portion of the region—Akron’s PMSA.  The city of Akron’s share of 
employment in technological industries is 5.1 percent and the PMSA’s share is 6.1 
percent.  Akron’s technology LQ is 0.84, which is the lowest of any MSA listed in Table 
6.  One of the reasons for this result is the size of the city and PMSA and the degree to 
which it is integrated into the CMSA.  The data indicate that in metropolitan areas with 
multiple large central cities one will lag substantially behind the other in terms of its 
technological specialization.  Given the nature of industrial clustering behavior this 
should be expected.  The shares of employment in technological positions in San Antonio 
city and its MSA are three percentage points lower than in Austin.  Boston’s share of 
technology employment is much higher than that of Worchester and Manchester.   
The real issue for the Akron PMSA, as the smaller metropolitan area in the 
region, is its competitive role in the region and the full integration of its resources into the 
regional economy.  The region as a whole should be concerned about the ability of is 
businesses to stimulate new product development off of its rich industrial base and 
                                                 
22 “When Economies Converge: Boss Talk with Eaton Corporation’s Chairman Stephen R. Hardis,” Wall 
Street Journal, June 22, 2000, p. B1. 
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heritage.  Northeast Ohio is a technologically dependent economy, one that adapts 
technologies to a mature existing product base.  One of the major barriers the region 
confronts is a change in the way it makes economic investments and stimulates 
innovation. 
When the Cleveland economy crashed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an 
organization formed by the business community, Cleveland Tomorrow, led a concerted 
regional effort to reinvest and reinvigorate the regional economy.  A large portion of 
Cleveland Tomorrow’s energy was focused on the city of Cleveland, but they also 
formed a number of subsidiary organizations that focused on specific regional economic 
problems.  These organizations included the Edison Biotech Institute in Cleveland, the 
Edison Polymer Institute in Akron, the Cleveland Advanced Manufacturing Program 
(which is region-wide in mission), and a very practical labor-management body known as 
the Work in Northeast Ohio Council.  Cleveland Tomorrow spun these subsidiaries off as 
they matured and achieved independent funding and constituency bases.   Cleveland 
Tomorrow worked closely with elected officials, particularly the Governor, the Mayor of 
Cleveland, the regional delegation in the state legislature—who held a number of 
politically powerful leadership positions—throughout the 1980s, Cuyahoga County’s 
Board of Commissioners, and the region’s Congressional Delegation—which also had 
senior positions in the majority party in the early 1980s.  Unfortunately, the heritage of 
cooperation and partnership has tattered over the past twenty years and regional political 
relationships have frayed, driven in no small measure by the confrontational political 
style of Cleveland’s current mayor. 
 
Public Sector Competition and Cooperation 
The federal system of government in the United States does not encourage or facilitate 
intergovernmental cooperation.23  Local governmental authority derives from state 
government, and the Constitution of Ohio and its legislative history provide few 
provisions to promote coordinated action among or between local governments.  The 
independence of local government in matters of zoning, land use, and local decision-
                                                 
23 Barnes, William R. and Larry C. Ledebur, The New Regional Economies: The U.S. Common Market and 
the Global Economy, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998). 
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making is enshrined in the Home Rule provision of the State Constitution, making 
regional cooperation especially difficult, limiting the state’s ability to intercede on these 
matters.  State economic development programs take little or no cognizance of regions or 
regional economies and, most often, promote competition among jurisdictions even 
within a single regional economy rather than coordinated economic development 
strategies and program implementation.  Where the state provides authority to localities 
for economic development, such as the state tax abatement program, these tools promote 
inter-jurisdictional competition even when it simply moves existing economic activity 
within the economic region. 
There is no tradition and very little experience with cooperation between or 
among local governments in the metropolitan region.  The political culture of the region 
and, particularly, that of the city of Cleveland, does not reflect or support a regional 
orientation or even recognition that the economy is regional rather than jurisdictional.  
Rhetoric and action of the city’s political leadership has long reflected the view that 
Cleveland is dominant within the region, an orientation generating resentment throughout 
the rest of the metropolitan region and its political jurisdictions. 
Elected political leadership of Cleveland has not supported, and often opposed, 
efforts to promote regional strategies or solutions to development problems.  The 
prevailing view is that the city will participate in regional initiatives only if it can 
exercise significant control and if the benefits accrue primarily to Cleveland.  This 
indifference and, at times, opposition to regional approaches has discouraged the search 
for regional and cooperative strategies to build the economy of the metropolitan region. 
The region now confronts the need to develop a “world class” international 
airport.24  Currently Cleveland Hopkins International Airport serves as a hub for 
Continental Airlines, which has indicated that current facilities are inadequate to support 
expansion of service and international flights.  Proposals to develop the array of airports 
in Northeast Ohio into a regional air system or network have been rejected or ignored by 
                                                 
24 Hill, Edward W. “The Air Services Hierarchy in North America: A regional perspective on air services 
and economic development,” Economic Development Commentary, (Fall 1998) 22(3): 30-38 and Hill, 
Edward W. The Future of Northeast Ohio’s Airports: Framing the Coming Debate (Cleveland: The Urban 
Center, October 14, 1997) http://cua6.csuohio.edu/~ucweb/pubs/airport.pdf  
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the political leadership of the city of Cleveland, which owns and operates Cleveland 
Hopkins.  This posture has effectively paralyzed and perhaps polarized regional 
discussions of alternative strategies, forcing other air facilities in the region, including the 
Akron-Canton Airport, to develop “go-it-alone” strategies.  This regional course of action 
will ultimately result in non-complementary investments in the wider region and, in all 
probability, a more limited array of uncoordinated air services for the region. 
In general, public sector organization for economic development is through 
political jurisdictions.  Within the Cleveland-Akron metropolitan region Summit County, 
the city of Akron, Cuyahoga County and the city of Cleveland operate separate economic 
development departments with little evidence of coordination or cooperation.  In 
Cuyahoga County, the primary public sector actor in the city is the Cleveland city 
government. The county economic development effort focuses more on jurisdictions of 
the County beyond the City of Cleveland. The only real regional development entity is 
the regional chamber of commerce—the Greater Cleveland Growth Association.  The 
Growth Association often takes the lead in putting together the financing on complicated 
business location deals.   
The exception to the fragmentation of public sector economic development 
programs is the Northeast Ohio Trade and Economic Consortium (NEOTEC).25  This 
economic partnership, founded in 1996, seeks to “promote trade, business growth and 
economic opportunities throughout Northeast Ohio.”  The organizing partners were six 
counties. Two, Summit and Portage, are in the Cleveland-Akron CMSA.  Two others 
[Mahoning and Trumbull] are in the Youngstown MSA.  The other two counties lie to the 
south of Summit County and Mahoning County.  This geographical configuration reflects 
what is often considered the greater region of Northeast Ohio, with the exception of 
Cuyahoga County.  Whether by choice or exclusion, Cuyahoga County is conspicuous by 
its absence from this regional economic development initiative. 
NEOTEC emphasizes a regional approach based on cooperation rather than 
competition.  Its mission includes building strategic partnerships with economic 
development organizations and public agencies.  These include the Ohio Departments of 
Development and Transportation, major energy companies in the area, the Akron-Canton 
                                                 
25 http://www.neotec.org/home.shtml 
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Regional Airport, the Youngstown-Warren Airport, and the port authorities of each of the 
participating counties. 
The consortium was founded around three guiding principles:  enhancing rather 
than duplicating existing development efforts; defining county interests within regional 
goals; and one county, one vote. 
NEOTEC has adopted these goals: 
1. To develop Northeast Ohio's inter-modal infrastructure resources into a 
seamless transportation system that offers time, cost, and flexibility options to 
firms shipping to and from Northeast Ohio; 
2. To promote the resources of Northeast Ohio on a national and international 
basis to improve the region's position and participation in the global economy; 
3. To work with entities in the region to improve the competitive position of the 
region and enhance the region's capability to support business. 
 
Business Networks for Regional Cooperation 
Chambers of Commerce are important organizations in economic development in 
Northeast Ohio.  The Greater Cleveland Growth Association, the largest chamber in the 
United States when measured by the number of member companies, played a critical role 
in efforts to revitalize both the image and reality of Cleveland after the fiscal default of 
city government and the pervasive national notoriety surrounding the decline of 
manufacturing employment and the fire on the Cuyahoga River.  The region’s 50 largest 
corporations created a second business organization focused on the renaissance of 
Cleveland, Cleveland Tomorrow.  The primary emphasis of Cleveland Tomorrow has 
been, and continues to be, the development of the city of Cleveland.  Its most visible 
work has been on the downtown through large-scale projects, such as professional sports 
stadiums, and waterfront development projects such as the Great Lakes Science Center 
and the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame.  Recently the organization has focused equal energy 
and financial resources on recreating housing markets in Cleveland’s neighborhoods.  In 
so doing, Cleveland Tomorrow has replicated the strategy it used in the arena of regional 
development—e stablishing intermediaries, sheltering them, and once they become viable 
spinning them off as independent entities.  
 31
Both the Greater Cleveland Growth Association and Cleveland lay claim to being 
regional organizations.  This claim is accurate in terms of membership, but not in actions 
other than those providing constituency services to business membership and in the case 
of Cleveland Tomorrow supporting the organizations it spun off in the mid-1980s. 
The Akron Regional Development Board [ARDB], the chamber for what they 
term the Greater Akron Region, encompasses the three southern counties of the 
metropolitan region, Summit, Portage, and Medina.  ARDB has historically emphasized 
business development services and economic development. 
Neither the Greater Cleveland Growth Association nor Cleveland Tomorrow have a 
rich history of collaboration with ARDB.  Recently the three organizations plus the 
Cleveland Port Authority jointly sponsored a major study of industrial clusters and 
industry drivers in Northeast Ohio.26  On one level this collaboration reflects a growing 
understanding that the economy is regional, not jurisdictional.  
A new private sector organization was created in 1999, The Northeast Ohio 
Regional Business Council [RBC].  This organization was expressly established to create 
a regional focus for addressing critical development issues. The drivers behind this new 
entity are the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of major corporations in the region.  
Through their leadership and influence, chambers of commerce and other business 
organizations were brought to the table, with greater or lesser degrees of enthusiasm, as 
major partners and constituents of the Regional Business Council.  The initial priorities 
established by RBC are work force development, regional airport capacity, and 
technology development. Implementation strategies around these priorities are still in the 
formative stages. 
It is too early to assess the impact or potential impact of this new organization 
other than its regional emphasis and strong corporate backing.  In designing the model for 
this new organization, the founders explicitly rejected the possibility of creating a public-
private partnership to address the needs of the region.  The public sector is nowhere 
represented in RBC.  In this way it is the regional complement to Cleveland Tomorrow.  
                                                 
26 Kleinhenz, Jack, “An Introduction to the Northeast Ohio Clusters Project,” Economic Development 
Quarterly 14(1) (February 2000): 63-64. 
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It is a private sector organization that is only now turning to develop a partnership with 
higher education to pursue some objectives.  
 
Work Force Issues 
Work force development is serving as a major catalyst for starting the process of 
thinking about and addressing development issues in a regional context.  Throughout 
most of the last two decades, the primary workforce issue in the Cleveland-Akron 
metropolitan region was the labor impacts of the industrial restructuring of the 
manufacturing base of the Midwest.  Workforce development initiatives over this 
industrial watershed focused on political jurisdictions rather than the wider economic 
region or regional labor market.  Until July 1, 2000, the primary federal program was Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA).  This program created local public/private boards to 
administer core federal training dollars organized around political jurisdictions. Some 
larger city and county governments administered, and continue to administer, workforce 
development designed primarily to attract and retain industry and, in some cases, to 
alleviate poverty within their political jurisdictions. 
In the mid-1990s, the region confronted a new challenge for which it was ill 
prepared.  The industrial restructuring of the previous decade and a half weeded out 
weaker firms.  The restructuring of surviving firms displaced labor, in part because of 
reductions in scale of enterprise, but also in part through advancing technology embedded 
in new capital equipment and production techniques that created a growing demand for 
skilled labor that could not be met from the existing regional labor pool.  The corporate 
community began to express growing concern about the shortage of skilled workers, as 
well as the failures of the education [K-12 and higher education] and training systems to 
generate an adequate supply of workers with requisite skills. 
In the second half of the 1990s, welfare reform became a preoccupation of the 
federal government and many or most state governments.  The federal Family 
Independence Act mandated states, and through them, local governments, to implement 
aggressive strategies to reduce welfare rolls by preparing those capable of employment to 
move from “welfare to work.”  Counties, the primary jurisdictions responsible for the 
local implementation of “welfare to work,” were effectively preempted from responding 
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to the growing cry for higher skilled workers by the monumental challenge posed by 
welfare reform. 
The initial and most focused response in the demand for skilled workers and the 
criticism to education and training systems was through private sector constituency 
organizations, in most cases chambers of commerce.  The Greater Cleveland Growth 
Association, primarily focused on Cleveland and Cuyahoga County, launched the Jobs 
and Workforce Initiative with the support of the Cleveland Foundation and the George 
Gund Foundation, the two largest local charitable foundations in the region, designed to 
be a “pioneering effort to build a skilled regional workforce prepared to meet the 
demands and embrace the opportunities the next century will bring.”  The Akron 
Regional Development Board launched a similar Workforce Development Initiative for 
Medina, Portage, and Summit Counties.  Through a broad-based coalition of public, 
private, and education partners the Workforce Institute of Lorain County was established 
as a countywide resource to address current and workforce needs through data and 
information, evaluation, and collective action.  Lake County developed the Workforce 
Development Initiative focused primarily on facilitating the transition from school-to-
work.  
These private and quasi-private initiatives constitute the core of the response to 
the need to increase the supply of skilled workers in the region.  They have tended to 
define their geographical scope in terms of jurisdictions and focus their activities within 
these boundaries.  In 1996, a coalition of higher education institutions established the 
Northeast Ohio Workforce [NOW] Initiative to promote regional solutions to workforce 
development needs.  NOW, recently renamed the Regional Workforce Partnership, is a 
composed of the primary workforce development initiatives in the larger 14-county 
region of Northeast Ohio.  This partnership has successfully refocused the dialogue about 
workforce development into a regional context and created a forum for the exploration of 
collaborative regional strategies for workforce development.  The relatively new private 
sector Regional Business Council has identified workforce development as one of its 
three priority areas and the Regional Business Partnership as its workforce development 
initiative. 
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On July 1, 2000, the federal Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) replaces 
the federal Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA).  Under this new legislation, the state 
seeks to create a “vertically integrated workforce investment system with all elements 
coordinated and complementary to promote Ohio’s economic competitiveness.”  This 
comprehensive workforce system is intended to integrate investments made in welfare, 
education, economic development, and workforce development.  The local expression of 
WIA is One Stop Centers.  These centers are “required partners” of federally funded or 
mandated employment related programs ranging from welfare reform to trade adjustment 
assistance under the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA].   
The primary focus of One Stop service delivery systems are counties or 
configurations of counties.  There are four One Stop Centers in the Cleveland/Akron 
Metropolitan Region:  Cleveland/Cuyahoga County One Stop, Summit-Medina 
Employment and Training Connection, Portage-Geauga One Stop Inc., and the 
Employment Network of Lorain County.   
Under WIA, each state had the opportunity to provide special incentives for 
regional strategies and coordination in the implementation of the one-stop delivery 
system.  Ohio did not avail itself of this option.  A regional consortium was created to 
discuss mutual issues, opportunities, and implementation steps, although the design and 
implementation of each proceeded independently.  The outcome is a set of one-stop 
service delivery centers that have separate computer software systems that can neither 
communicate among the different centers of the region, nor share information across the 
region.  Leadership of the centers, however, is in close communication and, hopefully, 
will develop strategies to coordinate the delivery of one-stop services across the regional 
labor market.  
 
Concluding Observations 
 The Cleveland-Akron metropolitan area region has evolved into a region with 
multiple employment centers, the two largest of which are the cities of Cleveland and 
Akron.  They are in vigorous competition with a number of suburban “edge cities” and 
belts of employment located along the interstate highway system as places where work 
can locate.  In this political-economic environment economic development coordination 
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and infrastructure investment takes places through two routes: the market places and 
higher level of governments.   However, governmental coordination is weak, which is 
consistent with American political tradition. 
 The real coordination takes place in disaggregated form through the actions of 
thousands of decision-makers—employers and households—who respond to competitive 
public service bundles, taxes, and access to transportation infrastructure through the 
marketplace.  Because the region’s economic competitive advantage lies predominantly 
in the manufacturing sector those business locations that are most amenable to supporting 
manufacturing and the support services required for manufacturing are advantaged in the 
competition for work.  These building sites tend to be large suburban parcels of land that 
can accommodate one story and two story buildings. 
 We have shown that political boundaries are largely irrelevant to the regional 
economy, except in the packages of local services and taxes municipalities provide to 
residents and businesses.  There does not appear to be an economic logic that gives any 
particular location in the metropolitan area a competitive advantage over another, as long 
as the location has access to the interstate highway system.   We have also documented 
that the region does not have an overarching formal political structure because the 
regional economy is larger than any one unit of local government—be it a municipality, 
county, or special district.  Yet, the regional economy appears to be working in terms of 
producing employment, income, and wealth.  This disaggregated approach to governance 
does have its costs.  The largest and most immediate is the failure of government to 
provide an environment to develop a regional system of air services.  (We have not 
addressed another regional political failure in this paper with economic consequences.  
This is the concentration of the region’s poverty population in its central cities with 
associated costs in terms of local service delivery.  The problem is less severe in Ohio’s 
urban centers then in other places in the United States, however, due to the presence of a 
wage tax that is assessed on suburban residents who work in the region’s cities.)  
Local government does have an important role to play in the competitiveness of 
this economy.  First, local government has the responsibility for linking its residents and 
properties to the regional markets, both physically and economically.  The economic 
connections are the tax costs that are charged for locating in particular political 
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jurisdictions and the quality of the services that are provided for taxes paid.  Second, 
regional coordination is dependent on interjurisdictional cooperation on issues of 
economic development infrastructure—this is where local government is failing in 
Northeast Ohio. 
 When Northeast Ohio was in a state of profound economic crisis in the early 
1980s there was intergovernmental cooperation.  This was a pragmatic response to a 
region-wide economic crisis, by a broad range of elected political leaders at the urgings 
of the region’s business establishment, and a reaction to the political style of Cleveland’s 
then-Mayor Voinovich, the leadership of current-Mayor Michael White during his first 
term in office, and the consistent political style of Akron’s Mayor Donald Plusquellic.  
Now that the crisis has long past, separate local agendas dominate the local political 
scene and the state legislature is placing less emphasis on economic development issues 
and more emphasis on a state wide fiscal and social issues. 
 A series of metropolitan area case studies is currently being conducted for the 
Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy at the Brookings Institution on sprawl.  Recent 
meetings of the researchers has led to the conclusion that regional cooperation within the 
American political context requires a crisis that allows an external actor—sometimes a 
court and at other times a higher unit of government—to impose regional coordination.  
In the case of Northeast Ohio this coordination and cooperation was a reaction to 
economic crisis that threatened the fiscal well-being of the state and had national political 
consequences.  In the current case of Los Angeles the region is responding to the 
pressures of development due to the combination of the requirements of the Endangered 
Species Act and the failure of the Los Angeles basin to meet federal air quality 
requirements.  The state of Georgia has embarked on an ambitious program of 
coordinated transportation investment and land use controls, again in response to the 
Atlanta metropolitan region’s failure to attain minimal federal air quality standards.  
Phoenix, Arizona is approaching land use and development investments from a regional 
perspective due to shortages in infrastructure and the state’s role in approving and 
funding highway and water infrastructure.  Metropolitan Chicago is a special case, where 
the revitalization of inner-city and inner-ring suburban real estate markets appears to be 
triggered by the fact that the outer suburbs have imposed five acre lot residential zoning 
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on an nearly uniform basis, increasing real estate development costs that reflect 
development pressures back into the core of the metropolitan region.  In all of these 
cases, these external actions have triggered scarcity that translates into market forces that 
stimulate city-based development and regional governmental cooperation. 
 At the current time, Northeast Ohio is largely absent these pressures.  However, 
there are two events that may trigger some mild form of cooperation—again through 
external actors.  The first is a shortage of skilled labor.  Regional businesses have formed 
a new organization to react to the regional shortage of skilled entry-level labor that is 
causing some nascent governmental cooperation to take place.  The second is the finding 
of the State Supreme Court that the way the state participates in the financing of its 
primary and secondary educational system does not meet the standards of the state’s 
constitution.  The Court found that the system is too dependent on local sources of 
property wealth.  This ruling will require the state legislature to find some way to pool 
property wealth for purposes of taxation that flows to schools.  The diminution of 
pressure to accumulate property wealth for purposes of local educational finance may 
lessen local economic development competition. 
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